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This paper assesses the impact of external and internal factors on output loss 
in emerging economies during the “Great Recession”. In particular, trade and capital 
openness are the external factors considered, while financial institutions and the 
quality of governance are the internal ones. The fixed effect estimates of an 
unbalanced panel of 122 emerging countries observed from 2008 to 2010  yields 
three main results. First, trade openness has played a major role in emerging 
markets and it has exacerbated output loss in the crisis period. Second, when 
significant, capital openness can help mitigate the negative impact of an external 
shock, but this is conditional on the level of financial development. Moreover, the 
development of financial markets has mattered more, in terms of direct output loss 
mitigation, than that of financial institutions. Finally, our analysis supports the 
hypothesis of possible inter-relations between financial and institutional 
development on the crisis's severity. For instance, a high leverage has exacerbated 
output loss in low-quality institution countries, while the liquidity ratio has buffered 
it in high-quality institution economies.  
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1. Introduction  
Drastic reductions in output growth were observed in both advanced and 
emerging economies between 2008 and 2010 as a consequence of the 2007-2008 
global financial crisis (IMF, 2015). Different explanations have been put forward as to 
the origins of the crisis: global imbalances, lax financial regulation and corporate 
governance, over-leveraging, securitization, poor ratings agencies and inadequate 
monetary policy (see Kristin et al., 2012, for a complete overview). Among them, the 
importance of "external factors", such as global imbalances has been widely 
documented as one of the key crisis-triggering mechanisms in developed countries 
(see for example Council of Economic Advisers, 2009, and Chinn, Eichengreen and 
Ito, 2014).  
As regards emerging markets, it has been suggested that their growth rates, 
during the financial crisis as well as in its aftermath, were strongly influenced not 
only by external factors but also by  internal ones (IMF, 2014). In other words, both 
the classic determinants of the current account, i.e. trade and capital openness, as 
well as financial and institutional features, seem to have been important 
determinants of the crisis's severity in laggard economies. Despite the important role 
that the aforementioned factors may have played in making some emerging 
countries more vulnerable than others to such an exogenous shock, we are not 
aware of any study that attempts their systematic and general assessment.1 Hence, 
the main aim of the present work is to fill this gap in the literature. A key 
contribution of the present work, therefore, consists in empirical assessment of how 
both openness and internal institutional features affected the output response of 
emerging economies to the external shock of the global crisis. The internal factors 
considered are those related to the functioning and development of financial 
institutions and markets, as well as the quality of governance. In particular, the main 
novelty of the paper is its one-by-one assessment of the impact of individual 
features of the financial systems on countries' output loss due to the financial crisis. 
To this end, we rely on the financial indicators collected in the Cihak et al. (2012) 
Global Financial Development Database and, following its theoretical framework, we 
carefully consider the complexity of countries' financial development. More in detail, 
we tackle the issue of financial systems' multidimensionality by analyzing four salient 
characteristics: financial depth, access, efficiency and stability, for both financial 
institutions and markets. Moreover, drawing on Chinn and Ito (2006) we consider 
the possible inter-relations between financial and institutional development.  We 
explore whether the impact of external and internal factors on output loss is 
influenced by the quality of institutions, as measured by the Kaufmann indicators of 
good governance. 
For these purposes, we consider a panel of up to 122 emerging market 
economies, identified according to the IMF WEO (2008, 2015) lists, observed 
between 2008 and 2010. Our approach, which relies on a 3-year panel, is motivated 
by the fact that the timing of the crisis was different across countries. As noted by 
Claessens et al. (2010), if one looks only at growth in 2008, the picture may not be 
very realistic because some countries that appear to have been relatively unscathed 
in 2008 were badly hit in 2009, and to a lesser extent in 2010. In particular, various 
studies (see Didier et al., 2011, for a review) have documented that emerging 
countries were hit hardest in 2009, the central year in our three-year panel. 
The main results of our analysis can be summarized as follows. First, trade 
openness has played a major role in emerging markets, and it has exacerbated 
output loss in the crisis period. Second, when significant, capital openness has 
mitigated crisis output loss. However, capital openness statistical significance is 
related to the internal characteristics of financial systems. Moreover, it has been 
found that the development of financial markets has mattered more, in terms of 
direct output loss mitigation, than that of financial institutions. Finally, our analysis 
has highlighted some inter-relations between financial and institutional 
development. In particular, it has been shown that the stability of financial 
institutions is relevant only when institutional quality has been considered. Overall 
the results of our analysis contribute to extending the existing literature and are in 
line with those of Fratzscher (2011) and Lane (2013) in so far as they show that crisis 
responses have been highly heterogeneous across countries.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview 
of the data and the methodology employed. Section 3 contains some descriptive 
evidence and the discussion of the main econometric results. We conclude with 
some final remarks and policy implications. 
 2. Empirical Specification, Econometric Technique and Data 
As explained in the Introduction, the main objective of this paper is to 
conduct a systematic assessment of the role played by both external and internal 
factors in emerging economies' output loss due to the global financial crisis, with 
particular regard to the characteristics of financial systems and the quality of  
governance. 
As for the external factors, we consider the traditional determinants of the 
current account, which are trade and capital openness.  Instead, as regards  the 
internal features, we explicitly consider the development and functioning of financial 
institutions and markets, as well as the quality of governance.  
The unified empirical framework adopted here makes it possible to take both 
external and internal factors into consideration. It is formally written as:   
 

Crisisit 0 1TOit 2KOit 3FDit it                                     (1) 
 
where i and t respectively indicate countries and years, Crisis represents the output 
loss due to the global financial crisis, TO and KO measure trade and capital openness, 
FD stands for any characteristic of financial development considered here, and 

it is 
the idiosyncratic error term. 
Drawing on Berkmen et al. (2012), Crisis was computed as the difference 
between actual GDP growth outturns in 2008, 2009 and 2010 and those forecasted 
before the crisis acquired its global nature.2 In particular, we calculated this indicator 
for 2008 as the difference between the GDP growth rate prediction as published by 
the IMF (WEO) in April 2008 and the actual data reported in the latest issue of the 
same publication, which dates to April 2015. Similarly, in order to compute the crisis 
indicator in 2009 (2010), we took the difference between the growth prediction 
made for 2009 (2010) by the April 2008 WEO and the actual 2009 (2010) data 
reported in WEO April 2015.3 In essence, our crisis indicator represents the "growth 
surprises" that can be ascribed to the global financial crisis. Hence, by its 
construction, the indicator rules out a number of serious endogeneity issues (e.g. 
simultaneity) that might undermine the consistency of any econometric result. 
Moreover, because it was calculated for three years (2008-2010), it makes it possible 
to provide a realistic picture of the costs, in output terms, associated with the Great 
Recession. 
Turning to the other variables, TO was taken as the sum of exports and 
imports ratios to GDP. The data come from World Bank Development Indicators. KO 
is the Chinn Ito Index, as in its latest release, i.e. January 2015. Chinn and Ito (2006) 
introduced an index to measure the degree of capital openness, called KAOPEN. This 
index is the first standardized principal component of the four binary variables 
measured in the IMF Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions (AREAER). These variables are indicator variables for (i) the existence of 
multiple exchange rates, (ii) restrictions on current account, (iii) restrictions on 
capital account transactions and (iv) a variable indicating the requirement of the 
surrender of export proceeds. The Chinn-Ito index is normalized between zero and 
one. The more open the country, the higher the value of the Chinn-Ito index.  
The variable FD captures some salient features of financial intermediaries 
and markets that, in the spirit of Beck et al. (2000 and 2009) and Cihak et al. (2012), 
describe the functioning of the financial side of an economy. In particular, following 
the 4x2 matrix of Cihak et al. (2012), we considered the depth, the accessibility, the 
efficiency, and the stability of both financial intermediaries and markets. Overall, we 
analysed the impact of 26 variables selected on the basis of data availability. See 
Table  A1 in the appendix for full details on the financial variables employed.  
In order to assess how the quality of governance affected the responsiveness 
to the global crisis, we investigated whether the impact of the variables of interest 
depended on countries’ institutional set-ups. A growing number of studies have 
recently provided supportive evidence for the likely non-linearity between both the 
external and the internal factors considered here and political institutions. Hence, 
given the likely interrelations among trade, capital openness, financial development 
and institutions, the impact of our explanatory variables on crisis output loss can be 
expected to change depending on the country’s institutional environment. To 
measure institutional quality we employed the Kaufmann indicators of good 
governance. More specifically, we aggregated three of the available indictors, 
namely Rule of Law, Control of Corruption and Bureaucratic quality, into a composite 
index calculated using the Cronbach Coefficient Alpha4. To understand how trade, 
capital openness and the functioning of the financial system affected the extent of 
the crisis in different institutional environments, we divided our sample into two 
groups of countries, namely countries with good institutional quality and countries 
with very low institutional quality. This division was made on the 25th percentile of 
the aggregate institutional index for the sample considered. Hence countries for 
which the institutional indicator assumed a value above the 25th percentile were 
classified as good quality institutions, and as ones of very low quality otherwise.5 For 
conciseness, we only report the results based on the aggregate index. However, we 
repeated the same exercise for the six institutional indicators provided by the 
Kaufmann dataset (government effectiveness, political stability, rule of law, 
corruption control, voice and accountability and regulatory quality. See Table A1 for 
full details on the institutional variables employed.6 
Our econometric analysis relied on a fixed effects estimator on an 
unbalanced panel of 122 emerging countries, observed between 2008 and 2010 and 
identified according to the lists reported in the IMF WEO (2008, 2015). In order to 
avoid endogeneity issues, all the right hand side variables of Equation (1) were taken 
as the average of the previous three years, while, given the high persistency of 
institutions, such indicators are contemporaneous (see Berkmen et al., 2012; and 
Chinn, Ito and Eichengreen, 2014 for similar choices). Moreover, the main 
advantages of a panel with a fixed effect estimator is that the omitted variable bias is 
largely avoided by controlling for country level heterogeneity. This is particularly 
important in this context, because the sampled countries exhibit high levels of time 





3.1. Descriptive Evidence 
Tables 1-4 report countries listed by institutional quality and summary 
statistics. We have data on 122 countries. There are up to 31 countries in the low 
institutions group and up to 133 in the high institutions one. The number of 
observations available varies across the variable considered. For instance we have up 
to 309 observations for trade, capital openness and measures of financial stability, 
but as few as 149 observations for indicators financial market depth. 
To gain better understanding of the relationship between institutions and 
characteristics of financial systems, we first investigate whether financial systems 
are systematically different between the two groups of interest (very low vs. good 
quality institutions). The depth of financial institutions and markets is generally 
greater in good-quality institutions countries (especially if measured by the level of 
government effectiveness). For instance, the ratio of bank private credit to GDP is 
13% in the low-quality institutions group and 34% in the high-quality one. This 
means that financial institutions provide higher credit services in good-quality 
institutions countries. Unsurprisingly, there is greater access to financial institutions 
in good-quality institutions countries, where the number of bank accounts per 1000 
adults is 593, against 90 in the very low-quality institutions group.  
The indicators of the efficiency of financial institutions are also systematically 
different between the two groups. Generally, the data indicate that financial 
institutions are more efficient in countries with good-quality political institutions. For 
instance, overhead costs to total assets and the cost to income ratios are higher in 
very low-quality institutions countries. But there are exceptions. Returns on assets 
(ROA) and on equity (ROE) are higher in the low-quality institutions group.  Credit to 
government and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to GDP is higher in the good-quality 
institutions group. This is to be expected, given the prominence that the SOEs of 
emerging markets have acquired in the past few years. Indeed,  UNCTAD (2014) 
documents that SOEs account for more than 11% of global FDI flows, and that 60% 
of the latter are from emerging markets. 
 
3.2. Econometric Results 
Our empirical analysis was based on two main exercises. First, we estimated 
Equation (1) for the entire sample of emerging economies. Hence, we assessed the 
importance of trade and capital openness as well as financial system's characteristics 
for output loss due to the financial crisis. Tables 5 to 8 report the results. Second, we 
estimated (1) in two distinct groups of countries: those with high and those with low 
institutional quality. We were thus able to identify whether the impact of the 
internal and external factors on the crisis's severity was dependent on countries’ 
institutional set-ups. Tables 9-11 collect these estimates.  
Overall, our results can be summarized as follows. First, trade openness has 
played a major role in emerging markets, and it has exacerbated output loss in the 
period of crisis. Second, when significant, capital openness has mitigated crisis 
output loss. Third, capital openness statistical significance is related to the internal 
characteristics of financial systems, and to the depth of institutions and markets in 
particular. Fourth, the development of financial markets has mattered more, in 
terms of direct output loss mitigation, than that of financial institutions.8 Fifth, the 
stability of financial institutions turns out to be relevant only when institutional 
quality has been considered, while the effects of financial markets' depth seem to be 
unrelated with political institutions. Finally, the accessibility of financial institutions 
has had no effect across specifications.  
More in detail, as regards trade openness, the results reported in Tables 5-8 
show that an increase of one percentage point in the aforementioned variable has 
led to an average loss of 2 percentage points of output growth. This finding holds 
across specifications, and the magnitude of the effect ranges from 0.8 to 3.3 
percentage points. Qualitatively, our results confirm the detrimental effect of trade 
openness already found by a large part of the established literature.9 For example, 
Claessens et al. (2010) note that, in emerging economies, output contraction due to 
the 2007-2008 financial crisis only started once the collapse in global demand had 
led to a contraction of global trade. Hence, according to their analysis, especially 
small open economies and countries heavily reliant on exports suffered from the 
decline in international trade and the difficulty of financing trade. The same 
conclusion that trade openness made countries more vulnerable to the crisis has 
been reached by the cross-sectional analysis of the first year of the crisis conducted 
by Berkmen et al. (2012). Moreover, on the basis of dynamic panel models, Dabla-
Norris et al. (2015) have highlighted the importance of trade orientation and 
production structure for sensitivity to foreign shocks. In particular, this work shows 
that emerging countries have high elasticity of growth to trading partners' growth, 
and that for commodity-exporting developing economies in Sub-Saharan Africa and 
the Middle East the main channels of transmission of foreign shocks are those of 
emerging market leaders like China.  It should be also mentioned that a part of the 
literature – not focusing on the “Great Recession” period – has found that trade 
openness makes countries less vulnerable to severe sudden stops (e.g. Cavallo and 
Frankel, 2008).  
Turning to capital openness, our results show that “financial globalisation" 
did not have a significant impact on output loss in emerging markets (see Tables 5-
11). This general finding is in line with those of Chinn, Ito and Eichengreen (2014), 
who show that capital openness did not play a major role in determining the current 
account behaviour in emerging countries for the period 2006-2008. In addition, 
Broner et al. (2013) show limited foreign capital retrenchment in emerging markets' 
economies during crises.10 Nonetheless, on closer inspection of Table 5, it is 
interesting to note that capital openness has a significant mitigating effect when we 
control for deposit money bank assets to overall deposit assets (Column 3) and 
central bank assets (Column 5). In particular, an increase of one percentage point in 
capital openness is associated with a 0.45 percentage points lower output loss. This 
is consistent with the descriptive evidence provided by Lane (2013), which shows 
that financial openness amplified the crisis in some countries, whereas it provided a 
buffer for others. In particular, our findings seem to suggest that capital openness 
mitigated the impact of the crisis in countries with relatively better political 
institutions (see Table 9, Column 3 and 4), and also if we control for the size of 
central bank assets to GDP.11 
The analysis of internal factors, namely financial systems' characteristics and 
the quality of governance, shows that the efficiency of financial institutions and the 
depth of financial markets have played a role in the overall sample (see Tables 7 and 
8), while institutions' depth and stability turn out to be significant only when the 
quality of governance is considered (see Tables 9 and 10). As regards Financial 
Institutions' Efficiency (i.e. Table 10), our results show that higher returns on 
financial institutions' assets (Column 5) and higher credit to government (Column 8) 
made countries more vulnerable to the crisis while a higher lending-deposit spread 
(Column 2) mildly mitigated crisis output loss. These findings seem to support – from 
a very specific perspective – the much more general views expressed by De Gregorio 
and Guidotti (1995) and Méon and Weill (2010), who envisage a negative 
relationship between growth and the functioning of the financial system.12 
Turning to Financial Markets, Table 8 shows that the depth of markets, as 
measured through International Debt issues (Column 3), as well as Equity and Debt 
liabilities (Columns 4 and 6), significantly cushioned the effect of the crisis on output. 
Hence, fund-raising by financial markets from foreign investors as well as from short 
or long term investors turns out to be very important in the context of emerging 
markets. This result can also partly support the "financial catch-up" hypothesis of 
Goyal et al. (2011), as debt is often associated with final stages of the financial 
growth cycle, as illustrated by Berger and Udell (1998). 
Turning to the relationship between financial system functioning and 
governance, Table 9 (Columns 1, 2 and 5) shows that Financial Institutions' depth 
was detrimental in countries characterized by low institutional quality. Moreover, as 
far as stability is concerned, Table 10 supports the findings of Berkmen et al. (2012), 
since it shows that a high leverage exacerbated output loss in low-quality institution 
countries (Table 10, column 1), while the liquidity ratio buffered the output loss, but 
only in high-quality institution economies (Table 10, column 2). As for the 
accessibility of financial systems, as measured by bank accounts or bank branches 
per inhabitant, Table 6 (Columns 1 and 2) shows that this feature had no effect on 
output loss, even when institutional quality is taken into account. In this regard, it is 
important to note that Cihak et al. (2012) document that the global financial crisis 
generated less financial stability and less access. Hence, it seems that restricted 
access to financial services did not impact on countries' vulnerability, while liquidity 
availability did so, especially in low-quality institution economies. 
Overall, the results of our analysis are in line with those of Fratzscher (2011), 
which highlight that crisis responses were highly heterogeneous across countries, 
and that a large part of this heterogeneity can be explained by differences in the 
quality of domestic institutions.  
 
4. Conclusions and policy implications 
This study has empirically assessed how both (trade and capital) openness 
and several internal institutional features affected the 2008-2010 output response  
of emerging economies to the external shock of the global financial crisis and the 
consequent “Great Recession”. The internal factors considered have been those 
related to the quality of governance and to the functioning and development of 
financial institutions and markets. The main novelty of our analysis is its one-by-one 
assessment of the impact of individual features of financial systems on countries' 
output loss.  
Our results show that trade openness has played a major role in emerging 
economies by exacerbating output losses due to the global financial crisis; this 
finding is significant in all specifications, and the magnitude of the effect is 
remarkable. Capital openness statistical significance is related to some internal 
characteristics of financial systems (the depth of financial institutions and markets in 
particular) and, when significant, it contributed to mitigating crisis output loss, 
especially in countries with high quality institutions. Moreover, we have found that 
the development of financial markets has mattered more, in terms of output loss 
mitigation, than that of financial institutions; however, a distinction of the sample 
countries between market-based vs. bank-based financial systems produced not 
significant results. Finally, we have found supportive evidence on the inter-relations 
between financial and institutional development. In particular, the stability of 
financial institutions appears to be relevant only when institutional quality is 
considered. In addition, we have obtained a number of more specific results, of 
which here we highlight only the following: (i) higher returns on financial institutions' 
assets and a higher ratio between credit by domestic money banks to the 
government and state-owned enterprises to GDP (two of the variables measuring 
the efficiency of financial institutions) made countries more vulnerable to the impact 
of the global crisis while a higher lending-deposit spread mildly mitigated crisis 
output loss; (ii) the depth of markets, as measured through International Debt issues 
as well as Equity and Debt liabilities, significantly cushioned the effect of the crisis on 
output; (iii) the depth of Financial Institutions was detrimental in countries 
characterized by low institutional quality; (iv) a high leverage has exacerbated output 
loss in low-quality institution countries; (v) a higher liquidity ratio buffered the 
output loss but only in high-quality institution economies. 
 As for the policy implications, a first obvious but important consideration 
concerns the huge consequences that a financial crisis originating in a big country, 
such as the US, may have in today’s globalised context (dominated by a high and 
growing trade openness and financial interdependences): a well-designed 
“regulatory and governance system” is crucial for preventing the occurrence of 
global financial crises.13 Before turning to  more specific policy implications, it should 
be borne in mind that the policy implications derived from any analysis conducted in 
“normal times” are necessarily different from those that can be deduced from “crisis 
times” (i.e. when the impact of an external negative shock is investigated). Given the 
period of time analyzed here, the policy implications of the present analysis center 
on the relative importance of external and internal factors in crisis times.14 Over the 
past decades, a growing body of theoretical and empirical literature has shown the 
prevailing beneficial impact of greater openness on economic growth and 
development. However, more open (especially small) economies suffer more from 
the worsening of the (growth rate of) international trade that accompanies a global 
financial crisis, and they need to have room for more active counter-cyclical 
macroeconomic policies. Our results suggest that capital openness can help mitigate 
the negative impact of an external shock, but this is conditional on institutional 
quality. Therefore structural policies improving the quality of governance are needed 
to increase resilience to external negative shocks. The investigation of the various 
financial institutions and markets features does not allow the drawing of general 
policy implications, for example in favor of more market-based or more bank-based 
financial systems. As regards more specific policy implications, we mention only that 
policy makers (i) should be aware that higher bank credit to state-owned enterprises 
may be associated with greater output loss, (ii) should promote improvement in the 
quality of institutions (especially in the countries where they are of low quality). In 
fact, according to our results, high quality governance makes it possible to avoid the 
negative effect linked to higher depth and leverage of financial institutions, while it 
permits the positive effect related to a higher liquidity ratio. 
Our results contribute to shedding more light on the determinants of the 
severity of the 2008 global financial crisis and the consequent “Great Recession” in 
emerging economies. Our results could also stimulate further theoretical and 
empirical research on the topic of heterogeneous responses to external big shocks. 
On this latter point, it would be important to evaluate whether trade as well as 
capital compositions matter for emerging economies in the case of big external 
shocks like the last global financial crisis. Moreover, in order to derive clearer policy 
implications, it would be crucial to measure the medium-run impact of external and 
internal factors in emerging economies in terms of “cumulative output losses” (i.e. 
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DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS & COUNTRY LIST 
 
Table 1- List of Countries* 
country Obs country Obs 
    
Albania 3 Kazakhstan 3 
Algeria 3 Kenya 3 
Angola 3 Kuwait 2 
Antigua and 
Barbuda 2 Kyrgyz Republic 1 
Argentina 2 Lao PDR 2 
Armenia 3 Lesotho 3 
Azerbaijan 3 Liberia 2 
Bahamas, The 1 Libya 2 
Bahrain 2 Macedonia, FYR 3 
Bangladesh 3 Madagascar 3 
Barbados 2 Malawi 3 
Belarus 3 Malaysia 1 
Belize 2 Maldives 2 
Benin 3 Mali 1 
Bhutan 3 Mauritania 1 
Bolivia 3 Mauritius 3 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 3 Mexico 3 
Botswana 3 Moldova 3 
Brazil 3 Mongolia 2 
Bulgaria 3 Morocco 3 
Cambodia 1 Mozambique 3 
Cameroon 3 Namibia 3 
Cape Verde 3 Nepal 3 
Central African 
Republic 3 Nicaragua 1 
Chad 3 Nigeria 3 
Chile 3 Oman 2 
China 3 Pakistan 3 
Colombia 3 Panama 3 
Comoros 3 Papua New Guinea 3 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 3 Paraguay 3 
Congo, Rep. 3 Peru 3 
Costa Rica 3 Philippines 3 
Cote d'Ivoire 3 Poland 3 
Croatia 3 Qatar 1 
Djibouti 1 Romania 3 
Dominica 2 Russia 3 
Dominican 
Republic 3 Samoa 2 
Ecuador 3 Saudi Arabia 3 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 3 Senegal 3 
El Salvador 3 Seychelles 3 
Equatorial Guinea 3 Sierra Leone 3 
Eritrea 1 South Africa 2 
Estonia 1 Sri Lanka 3 
Ethiopia 2 St. Lucia 2 
Fiji 3 
Vincent and the 
Grenadines 2 
Gabon 3 Sudan 1 




Ghana 3 Tajikistan 2 
Grenada 2 Thailand 2 
Guatemala 3 Togo 1 
Guinea-Bissau 2 Tonga 2 
Guyana 2 Trinidad and Tobago 2 
Haiti 2 Tunisia 3 
Honduras 3 Turkey 3 
Hungary 2 Uganda 3 





Rep. 1 Uruguay 3 
Jordan 3 Venezuela 3 
  Vietnam 3 
    Zambia 3 










Table 2 - Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
mGFDDDI01 296 30.94615 22.74769 1.696558 104.8281 
mGFDDDI02 298 38.9858 25.93611 2.312291 115.7957 
mGFDDDI04 267 86.50685 15.00538 5.715824 99.99958 
mGFDDDI05 298 44.11379 26.61273 6.041292 149.0429 
mGFDDDI06 262 5.822995 14.87474 0.0002653 169.7348 
      
mGFDDDI08 286 36.18711 23.46013 4.150724 135.3975 
mGFDDDI12 296 32.40544 24.82649 1.696558 146.2422 
mGFDDDM01 161 46.79247 46.25361 0.5336372 243.5069 
mGFDDDM02 158 21.37397 42.37168 0.0170923 289.9579 
mGFDDDM07 141 10.35107 9.791357 0.0392266 48.636 
      
mGFDDDM08 140 5.2954 7.910649 0.0088752 47.97027 
mGFDDDM09 147 4.360226 11.22492 0.0036124 67.97853 
mGFDDDM10 149 8.507427 15.72192 0.0000674 111.2168 
mGFDDAI01 129 515.0772 593.3292 2.813517 3106.095 
mGFDDAI02 193 11.44559 13.59313 0.4074766 91.0957 
      
mGFDDEI01 265 4.297437 2.000359 -3.360049 12.06948 
mGFDDEI02 243 8.602765 6.122725 0.4277779 39.1042 
mGFDDEI03 257 37.38115 14.72348 2.130245 166.0805 
mGFDDEI04 254 4.028482 2.268533 0.0634683 13.19367 
mGFDDEI05 290 1.680146 1.341008 -13.55811 5.403605 
      
mGFDDEI06 290 16.16535 18.96892 -120.5436 136.3415 
mGFDDEI07 287 55.44072 13.60018 14.60983 109.4866 
mGFDDEI08 309 8.693558 9.077525 0.126241 61.35155 
mGFDDSI01 289 18.11785 9.201635 4.047398 51.57125 
mGFDDSI04 300 95.9543 67.41942 22.41579 622.6824 
      
mGFDDSI06 284 37.56989 16.64266 8.227704 104.2282 
mtrade2 309 0.9085567 0.3796646 0.2589546 2.421892 
mkaopen 309 0.1557091 1.493626 -1.888895 2.389668 
gov 226 -0.2913589 0.6039522 -1.573231 1.225874 
Table 3- Summary Statistics by Institutions 
  Low Institutions High institutions 
Variable Obs Mean Obs Mean 
     
mGFDDDI01 49 13.00757 247 34.50481 
mGFDDDI02 49 16.42086 249 43.42629 
mGFDDDI04 49 74.33905 218 89.24181 
mGFDDDI05 49 23.4479 249 48.18057 
mGFDDDI06 47 10.89131 215 4.715037 
     
mGFDDDI08 50 17.41167 236 40.16495 
mGFDDDI12 49 13.24661 247 36.20618 
mGFDDDM01 13 29.06616 148 48.34951 
mGFDDDM02 11 10.54049 147 22.18464 
mGFDDDM07 10 7.796854 131 10.54605 
     
mGFDDDM08 14 0.9193058 126 5.781633 
mGFDDDM09 15 1.689488 132 4.663719 
mGFDDDM10 16 3.951013 133 9.055567 
mGFDDAI01 20 90.0995 109 593.0548 
mGFDDAI02 27 4.127879 166 12.63582 
     
mGFDDEI01 37 5.473916 228 4.106517 
mGFDDEI02 35 11.36771 208 8.13751 
mGFDDEI03 41 43.72502 216 36.17699 
mGFDDEI04 37 5.319787 217 3.808305 
mGFDDEI05 44 1.836108 246 1.65225 
     
mGFDDEI06 44 12.83595 246 16.76085 
mGFDDEI07 42 61.45022 245 54.41051 
mGFDDEI08 51 4.828804 258 9.457521 
mGFDDSI01 43 15.61855 246 18.55472 
mGFDDSI04 50 72.68735 250 100.6077 
     
mGFDDSI06 42 41.94348 242 36.81083 
mtrade2 51 0.8578139 258 0.9185873 
mkaopen 51 -0.1852232 258 0.2231026 
mstructure 13 1.514134 146 1.261383 
rule 51 -1.221492 175 -0.1460078 
     






















 Table 4- 
Low Institutions High institutions     
country Freq. country Freq.  Country  Freq. 
      
Angola 2 Albania 3 Djibouti 1 
Belarus 2 Algeria 3 Dominica 2 
Bolivia 2 Angola 1 Dominican Republic 3 
Cambodia 1 
Antigua and 
Barbuda 2 Ecuador 1 
Cameroon 2 Argentina 2 Egypt, Arab Rep. 3 
Central African 
Republic 2 Armenia 3 El Salvador 3 
Chad 2 Azerbaijan 3 Equatorial Guinea 1 
Comoros 2 Bahamas, The 1 Estonia 1 
Congo, Dem. 
Rep. 2 Bahrain 2 Ethiopia 2 
Congo, Rep. 2 Bangladesh 3 Fiji 3 
Cote d'Ivoire 2 Barbados 2 Gabon 3 
Ecuador 2 Belarus 1 Gambia, The 3 
Equatorial 
Guinea 2 Belize 2 Georgia 3 
Eritrea 1 Benin 3 Ghana 3 
Guatemala 2 Bhutan 3 Grenada 2 
Guinea-Bissau 2 Bolivia 1 Guatemala 1 
Haiti 2 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 3 Guyana 2 
Honduras 1 Botswana 3 Honduras 2 
Kenya 2 Brazil 3 Hungary 2 
Kyrgyz Republic 1 Bulgaria 3 India 3 
Lao PDR 1 Cameroon 1 Indonesia 3 
Liberia 2 Cape Verde 3 Iran, Islamic Rep. 1 
Mauritania 1 
Central African 
Republic 1 Jordan 3 
Nigeria 2 Chad 1 Kazakhstan 3 
Pakistan 1 Chile 3 Kenya 1 
Papua New 
Guinea 1 China 3 Kuwait 2 
Paraguay 1 Colombia 3 Lao PDR 1 
Sierra Leone 1 Comoros 1 Lesotho 3 
Sudan 1 Congo, Dem. Rep. 1 Libya 2 
Tajikistan 2 Congo, Rep. 1 Macedonia, FYR 3 
Venezuela 2 Costa Rica 3 Madagascar 3 
  Cote d'Ivoire 1 Malawi 3 
Total 51 Croatia 3 Malaysia 1 
  Maldives 2 Samoa 2 
  Mali 1 Saudi Arabia 3 
  Mauritius 3 Senegal 3 
  Mexico 3 Seychelles 3 
  Moldova 3 Sierra Leone 2 
  Mongolia 2 South Africa 2 
  Morocco 3 Sri Lanka 3 
  Mozambique 3 St. Lucia 2 
  Namibia 3 Vincent and the Grenadines 2 
  Nepal 3 Swaziland 3 
  Nicaragua 1 Syrian Arab Republic 3 
  Nigeria 1 Thailand 2 
  Oman 2 Togo 1 
  Pakistan 2 Tonga 2 
  Panama 3 Trinidad and Tobago 2 
  Papua New Guinea 2 Tunisia 3 
  Paraguay 2 Turkey 3 
  Peru 3 Uganda 3 
  Philippines 3 Ukraine 3 
  Poland 3 United Arab Emirates 1 
  Qatar 1 Uruguay 3 
  Romania 3 Venezuela 1 
  Russia 3 Vietnam 3 




TABLES – all countries 
 
Table 5 -Institution Depth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Crisis1 Crisis1 Crisis1 Crisis1 Crisis1 Crisis1 Crisis1 
        
mtrade2 11.43** 11.89** 15.81*** 10.82** 14.61*** 8.457* 11.43** 
 (5.401) (5.190) (5.402) (5.092) (4.813) (5.006) (5.366) 
mkaopen -2.751 -1.910 -4.517** -1.882 -4.534** -1.639 -2.729 
 (2.508) (2.420) (2.157) (2.525) (2.003) (2.428) (2.495) 
mGFDDDI01 0.0753       
 (0.0600)       
mGFDDDI02  0.0952      
  (0.0628)      
mGFDDDI04   0.0539     
   (0.0563)     
mGFDDDI05    0.0231    
    (0.0755)    
mGFDDDI06     0.0184   
     (0.140)   
mGFDDDI08      0.0627  
      (0.0680)  
mGFDDDI012       0.0771 
       (0.0594) 
Constant -10.18** -12.09** -16.38** -8.396* -10.71** -7.457 -10.35** 
 (5.132) (5.048) (7.912) (4.808) (4.564) (4.871) (5.059) 
        
Observations 299 301 273 301 267 290 299 
R-squared 0.025 0.026 0.053 0.018 0.052 0.012 0.025 
Number of ID 119 118 108 118 105 118 119 
mGFDDDI01Bank private credit to GDP; mGFDDDI02 Deposit bank money to GDP; mGFDDDI04 
Deposit money bank assets to deposit money bank assets and central bank assets; 
mGFDDDI05 Liquid liabilities to GDP; mGFDDDI06 Central bank assets to GDP; mGFDDDI08 
Financial system deposits to GDP; mGFDDDI12 Private credit by deposit money banks and 
other financial institutions to GDP (%). Standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 6-Institions Access & stability 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Crisis1 Crisis1 Crisis1 Crisis1 Crisis1 
      
mtrade2 9.336 11.37 12.70* 10.96* 16.66** 
 (9.148) (7.825) (6.500) (5.891) (6.728) 
mkaopen -3.807 -2.482 -1.615 -1.919 -1.911 
 (3.042) (2.995) (2.736) (2.697) (2.814) 
mGFDDAI01 0.00955     
 (0.00679)     
mGFDDAI02  0.248    
  (0.169)    
mGFDDSI01   0.0551   
   (0.0610)   
mGFDDSI04    0.00979  
    (0.0160)  
mGFDDSI06     -0.0687 
     (0.0533) 
Constant -11.35 -11.52 -10.12* -8.467 -10.13 
 (10.45) (7.363) (5.746) (5.906) (6.442) 
      
Observations 139 208 310 307 305 
R-squared 0.037 0.029 0.025 0.018 0.041 
Number of ID 53 79 120 123 119 
GFDDAI01Bank accounts per 1000 adults (commercial banks-bank survey); GFDDAI02 Bank 
branches per 100,000 adults (commercial banks) ; GFDDSI01 bank z score; GFDDSI04 bank 
credit/ bank deposit; GFDDSI06 Liquid assets to deposits and short term funding 




Table 7-Institions Efficiency 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Crisis1 Crisis1 Crisis1 Crisis1 Crisis1 Crisis1 Crisis1 Crisis1 
         
mtrade2 12.53* 13.34* 21.09*** 12.22* 12.11* 13.08** 15.65** 17.91*** 
 (6.446) (7.035) (5.137) (6.330) (6.571) (6.452) (6.843) (5.528) 
mkaopen -2.279 -0.677 1.669 -1.720 -1.410 -1.509 -1.609 0.589 
 (2.939) (3.012) (2.579) (2.859) (2.701) (2.734) (2.826) (2.369) 
mGFDDEI01 0.740        
 (0.482)        
mGFDDEI02  -0.380*       
  (0.196)       
mGFDDEI03   -0.00647      
   (0.0446)      
mGFDDEI04    0.323     
    (0.807)     
mGFDDEI05     0.373***    
     (0.136)    
mGFDDEI06      -0.00262   
      (0.0134)   
mGFDDEI07       -0.0255  
       (0.0630)  
mGFDDEI08        0.511** 
        (0.200) 
Constant -11.7* -6.752 -16.1*** -9.561 -9.290 -9.462 -10.43 -18.6*** 
 (6.133) (6.999) (4.702) (6.292) (5.955) (5.896) (7.281) (6.067) 
         
Observations 281 254 278 267 311 311 308 309 
R-squared 0.031 0.046 0.051 0.027 0.033 0.023 0.033 0.049 
Number of ID 109 104 109 103 121 121 120 122 
GFDDEI01 Net interest margin (%); GFDDEI02 Lending-deposit spread (%); GFDDEI03 Non-
interest income to total income (%); GFDDEI04 Overhead costs to total assets (%); 
GFDDEI05 Return on assets (%); GFDDEI06 Return on equity (%); GFDDEI07 Cost to income 
ratio (%); GFDDEI08 Credit to government and state-owned enterprises to GDP (%); 




Table 8-Market Depth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Crisis1 Crisis1 Crisis1 Crisis1 Crisis1 Crisis1 
       
mtrade2 25.02*** 22.29*** 11.15 22.94*** 23.34*** 33.39*** 
 (5.568) (5.580) (8.768) (6.564) (8.636) (10.48) 
mkaopen 3.265 3.480 -0.176 4.327 3.397 4.382 
 (3.488) (3.415) (3.632) (3.746) (3.925) (3.644) 
mGFDDDM01 0.00353      
 (0.0418)      
mGFDDDM02  -0.00593     
  (0.0146)     
mGFDDDM07   -0.284**    
   (0.116)    
mGFDDDM08    -0.198**   
    (0.0981)   
mGFDDDM09     0.509  
     (0.364)  
mGFDDDM10      -0.340** 
      (0.131) 
Constant -21.75*** -18.82*** -4.126 -17.12*** -20.95** -24.28*** 
 (5.382) (5.304) (8.547) (5.709) (8.205) (8.979) 
       
Observations 166 163 144 142 148 149 
R-squared 0.066 0.058 0.035 0.067 0.050 0.079 
Number of ID 62 60 59 53 59 58 
 
GFDDDM01Stock market capitalization to GDP (%);  GFDDDM02 Stock market total value 
traded to GDP (%); GFDDDM07 International debt issues to GDP (%);  GFDDDM08 Gross 
portfolio equity liabilities to GDP (%); GFDDDM09 Gross portfolio equity assets to GDP 
(%); GFDDDM10 Gross portfolio debt liabilities to GDP (%) ; Standard errors in 
parentheses ; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 9-Institution Depth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 





      
mtrade2 -4.246 -0.140 17.27** 13.25 -4.312 
 (13.14) (13.49) (8.323) (8.502) (13.09) 
mkaopen -5.592 1.813 -5.6** -5.4** -5.680 
 (7.639) (6.634) (2.473) (2.516) (7.610) 
mGFDDDI01 1.368**     
 (0.604)     
mGFDDDI02  0.901*    
  (0.478)    
mGFDDDI04   0.181   
   (0.176)   
mGFDDDI06    -0.089  
    (0.266)  
mGFDDDI12     1.393** 
     (0.603) 
Constant -14.95 -13.84 -29.06* -8.829 -15.85 
 (14.00) (14.68) (17.20) (7.935) (14.11) 
      
Observations 58 58 215 210 58 
R-squared 0.197 0.153 0.065 0.049 0.203 
Number of ID 34 33 98 97 34 
mGFDDDI01Bank private credit to GDP; mGFDDDI02 Deposit bank money to GDP; mGFDDDI04 
Deposit money bank assets to deposit money bank assets and central bank assets; 
mGFDDDI06 Central bank assets to GDP;mGFDDDI12 Private credit by deposit money banks 
and other financial institutions to GDP (%). Standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, 




Table 10-Institions Stability &Efficiency 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES low gov high gov high gov low gov high gov low gov high gov low gov 
         
mtrade2 1.883 13.37* 10.47 7.305 21.42** 38.41 21.97** 1.468 
 (10.48) (7.573) (8.820) (11.92) (9.212) (23.85) (8.808) (13.35) 
mkaopen -3.745 -2.579 -0.721 6.677 2.211 5.131 0.644 5.531 
 (5.791) (2.122) (2.416) (6.379) (2.586) (6.030) (2.352) (6.459) 
mGFDDEI03     -0.00132    
     (0.0925)    
mGFDDEI02   -0.311 -0.67*     
   (0.316) (0.322)     
mGFDDSI04 0.664***        
 (0.150)        
mGFDDSI06  -0.151**       
  (0.0665)       
mGFDDEI04      -4.69**   
      (2.193)   
mGFDDEI08       0.564** 2.652* 
       (0.252) (1.294) 
Constant -
48.44*** 
-4.028 -4.886 3.172 -17.18** -4.087 -23.75** -10.88 
 (14.90) (6.854) (8.219) (11.31) (8.411) (19.49) (9.572) (13.42) 
         
Observations 58 248 209 45 223 47 249 60 
R-squared 0.495 0.052 0.019 0.268 0.047 0.263 0.055 0.174 
Number of ID 35 112 95 28 101 27 112 35 
GFDDSI04 bank credit/ bank deposit; GFDDSI06 Liquid assets to deposits and short term 
funding (%); GFDDEI02 Lending-deposit spread (%); GFDDEI03 Non-interest income to 
total income (%); GFDDEI04 Overhead costs to total assets; GFDDEI08 Credit to 
government and state-owned enterprises to GDP (%);Standard errors in parentheses; *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 11-Market Depth 
 (1) (3) (3) 
VARIABLES high gov high gov high gov 
    
mtrade2 23.52* 20.72* 33.29** 
 (12.54) (12.27) (16.46) 
mkaopen 3.479 3.433 5.061 
 (3.311) (3.352) (3.428) 
mGFDDDM01 0.0152   
 (0.0687)   
mGFDDDM02  -0.00546  
  (0.0406)  
mGFDDDM10   -0.241 
   (0.263) 
Constant -21.29* -17.55 -25.61* 
 (11.79) (11.20) (13.76) 
    
Observations 147 146 130 
R-squared 0.054 0.046 0.076 
Number of ID 61 59 57 
 
GFDDDM01Stock market capitalization to GDP (%); GFDDDM02 Stock market total value 
traded to GDP GFDDDM10 Gross portfolio debt liabilities to GDP (%) ; Standard errors 






Table A1 – Variables’ Definitions and Sources 
 
 Variables   Source 
VARIABLES 
NAMES 
Definition    
     
Crisis Difference between actual and predicted GDP per capita 
growth rate in 2008,2009 and 2010. As for 2008: GDP per 
capita growth rate for 2008 as reported in WEO 2015 - 
GDP per capita growth rate for 2008 as reported in WEO 
2008. As for 2009 (2010): GDP per capita growth rate 
for 2009 (2010) as reported in WEO 2015 - GDP per 
capita growth rate for 2009 as reported in WEO 2008 









Trade & Capital openness 




     
mkaopen Chinn and Ito Index of capital openness. This index is 
the first standardized principal component of the four 
binary variables that are measured in the IMF AREAER. 
It is bounded between 0 and 1. The more open the 
country, the higher the index. 








     
Financial Institutions Depth 
mGFDDDI01 Bank private credit to GDP. The financial resources 
provided to the private sector by domestic money banks 
as a share of GDP. 






(Čihák et al, 
2012) 
     
mGFDDDI02 Deposit bank money to GDP. Assets include claims on 
domestic real nonfinancial sector which includes 
central, state and local governments, nonfinancial 
public enterprises and private sector. Deposit money 
banks comprise commercial banks and other financial 
institutions that accept transferable deposits, such as 
demand deposits. 
  GFDD 
    GFDD 
mGFDDDI04 Deposit money bank assets to deposit money bank assets 
and central bank assets. Assets include claims on the 
domestic real nonfinancial sector, which includes 
central, state and local governments, nonfinancial 
public enterprises and private sector. Deposit money 
banks comprise commercial banks and other financial 
institutions that accept transferable deposits, such as 
demand deposits. 
   
     
mGFDDDI05 Liquid liabilities to GDP. Ratio of liquid liabilities 
to GDP. Liquid liabilities are also known as ‘broad 
money’, or M3. They are the sum of currency and 
deposits in the central bank (M0), plus transferable 
deposits and electronic currency (M1), plus time and 
savings deposits, foreign currency transferable 
deposits, certificates of deposit, and securities 
repurchase agreements (M2), plus travelers checks, 
foreign currency time deposits, commercial paper, and 
shares of mutual funds or market funds held by 
residents. 
  GFDD 
     
mGFDDDI06 Central bank assets to GDP. Central bank assets are 
claims on the domestic real nonfinancial sector by the 
Central Bank. 
  GFDD 
    GFDD 
mGFDDDI08 Financial system deposits to GDP. Demand, time and 
saving deposits in deposit money banks and other 
financial institutions as a share of GDP. 
  GFDD 
    GFDD 
mGFDDDI12 Private credit by deposit money banks and other 
financial institutions to GDP. Private credit by 
deposit money banks and other financial institutions to 
GDP. 
  GFDD 
Financial Market Depth 
mGFDDDM01 Stock market capitalization to GDP. Total value of all 
shares listed on a stock market as a percentage of GDP. 
  GFDD 
     
mGFDDDM02 Stock market total value traded to GDP (%).Total value 
of all shares traded in a stock market exchange as a 
percentage of GDP. 
  GFDD 
     
mGFDDDM07 International debt issues to GDP. Total value of 
outstanding international debt issues both public and 
private, as a share of GDP. 
  GFDD 
    GFDD 
mGFDDDM08 Gross portfolio equity liabilities to GDP. Ratio of 
gross portfolio equity liabilities to GDP. Equity  
liabilities include shares, stocks, participations, and 
similar documents (such as American depository 
receipts) that usually denote ownership of equity. 
   
    GFDD 
mGFDDDM09 Gross portfolio equity assets to GDP. Ratio of gross 
portfolio equity assets to GDP. Equity  assets include 
shares, stocks, participations, and similar documents 
(such as American depository receipts) that usually 
denote ownership of equity. 
   
     
mGFDDDM10 Gross portfolio debt liabilities to GDP (%).Ratio of 
gross portfolio debt liabilities to GDP. Debt  
liabilities cover (1) bonds, debentures, notes, etc., 
and (2) money market or negotiable debt instruments. 
  GFDD 
     
Financial Institutions Access 
mGFDDAI01 Bank accounts per 1000 adults (commercial banks-bank 
survey);  
 
   
     
mGFDDAI02 Bank branches per 100,000 adults (commercial banks) 
 
 
  GFDD 
Financial Institutions Efficiency 
mGFDDEI01 Net interest margin (%).Accounting value of bank's net 
interest revenue as a share of its average interest-
bearing (total earning) assets. 
  GFDD 
     
mGFDDEI02 Lending-deposit spread (%).Difference between lending 
rate and deposit rate. Lending rate is the rate charged 
by banks on loans to the private sector, and deposit 
interest rate is the rate offered by commercial banks 
on three-month deposits. 
  GFDD 
     
mGFDDEI03 Non-interest income to total income (%).Bank’s income 
that has been generated by non-interest related 
activities as a percentage of total income (net-
interest income plus non-interest income). Non-interest 
related income includes net gains on trading and 
derivatives, net gains on other securities, net fees 
and commissions and other operating income. 
  GFDD 
     
mGFDDEI04 Overhead costs to total assets (%).Operating expenses 
of a bank as a share of the value of all held assets. 
Total assets include total earning assets, cash and due 
from banks, foreclosed real estate, fixed assets, 
goodwill, other intangibles, current tax assets, 
deferred tax, discontinued operations and other assets. 
  GFDD 
     
mGFDDEI05 Return on assets (%).Commercial banks’ net income to 
yearly averaged total assets. 
  GFDD 
     
mGFDDEI06 Return on equity (%).Commercial banks’ net income to 
yearly averaged equity. 
  GFDD 
     
mGFDDEI07 Cost to income ratio (%).Operating expenses of a bank 
as a share of the sum of net-interest revenue and other 
operating income. 
  GFDD 
     
mGFDDEI08 Credit to government and state-owned enterprises. Ratio 
between credit by domestic money banks to the 
government and state-owned enterprises and GDP. 
 
  GFDD 
Financial Institutions Stability    
mGFDDSI01 Bank z score. This captures the probability of default 
of a country's banking system, calculated as a weighted 
average of the z-scores of a country's individual banks 
(the weights are based on the individual banks' total 
assets). the z-score compares a bank’s buffers 
(capitalization and returns) with the volatility of 
those returns. 
  GFDD 
mGFDDSI04 bank credit/ bank deposit. The financial resources 
provided to the private sector by domestic money banks 
as a share of total deposits. Domestic money banks 
comprise commercial banks and other financial 
  GFDD 
institutions that accept transferable deposits, such as 
demand deposits. Total deposits include demand, time 
and saving deposits in deposit money banks. 
     
mGFDDSI06 Liquid assets to deposits and short term funding 
(%).The ratio of the value of liquid assets (easily 
converted to cash) to short-term funding plus total 
deposits. Liquid assets include cash and due from 
banks, trading securities and at fair value through 
income, loans and advances to banks, reverse repos and 
cash collaterals. Deposits and short term funding 
includes total customer deposits (current, savings and 
term) and short term borrowing (money market 
instruments, CDs and other deposits) 
  GFDD 
Political Instiutions 
highpolstab Dummy which takes value one if Political Stability 
takes a value greater than the 25  percentile.  




highvoice Dummy which takes value one if Voice and Accountability 
take a value greater than the 25  percentile. 
  WGI 
highgoveff Dummy which takes value one if Government Effectiveness 
takes a value greater than the 25  percentile. 
  WGI 
highregqual Dummy which takes value one if Regulatory Quality takes 
a value greater than the 25  percentile. 
  WGI 
Highrule Dummy which takes value one if Rule of Law takes a 
value greater than the 25  percentile. 
  WGI 
highcorrup Dummy which takes value one if Control of Corruption 
takes a value greater than the 25  percentile. 
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1 Due to increased globalization, many emerging economies are exposed to external economic shocks 
(e.g., Kutan, 2015). However, what exactly determines the vulnerabilities to global turmoil remains a 
contentious matter. 
2 It was especially with the collapse of Lehman Brothers (September 2008) that a remarkable global 
diffusion of the US crisis became much more evident.  
3 The predicted values of national GDP growth rates published in April 2008 by IMF are, obviously, the 
latest forecasts available for that time and refer to estimations made in the year 2007 or 2006. 
4 The Cronbach Coefficient Alpha assesses how a set of indicators measures a uni-dimensional 
concept (OECD, 2008 ). This technique is useful for clustering similar variables. It therefore seems 
particularly appropriate for the chosen Kaufmann indicators, which are highly correlated.  
5 We also carried out the same exercise with a different threshold: that is, we used the mean of the 
institutional indicators to create the two sub-samples of interest. These results are not reported 
here but are available upon request. 
6It is worth mentioning that, in order to verify whether the differences observed in the two groups 
were statistically significant, we carried out a further check. That is, we ran a regression between 
the variable of interest (i.e. any of the explanatory variables of Equation 1) and the dummy 
classifying the two groups of countries. If both the variable of interest and the interaction term 
were statistically significant, it could be concluded that the effect of the selected explanatory 
variable was different across the two groups (i.e. very low vs. good quality institutions); and hence 
that internal institutions played a major role in determining the severity of the crisis in terms of 
output loss 
7To be noted is that, following the suggestion of an anonymous referee, we have replicated our 
exercise in three distinct cross-sections, one for each of the years considered (i.e. 2008-2010). The 
results of our main exercise are qualitatively unaltered. To save space, we do not report them here, 
but they are available upon request. We thank a referee for suggesting this important robustness 
check. 
8 To be noted is that, in order to assess the relative importance of financial institutions and financial 
markets, we have split our sample into bank-based and market-based economies. This has been 
done following the recent work of Gambacorta et al.(2014). In line with Levine (2002), Beck and 
Levine (2002) and Chakraborty and Rayb (2006)  we do not find evidence that one system 
                                                                                                                                                        
outperforms the other in terms of making countries more resilient to global financial turmoil. To 
save space we have not reported these results here, but they are available upon request. We are 
grateful to an anonymous referee for providing this suggestion.  
9 As for the magnitude of the impact of trade openness, although our results are not comparable with 
others existing in the literature (mainly due to different specifications or periods), it should be 
highlighted that we find a quite high value of the coefficient (as detailed above). 
10 Differently, Maa (2015) reports that increased financial openness is associated with sharper 
volatility in the presence of foreign shocks. Consequently, it can aggravate the impact of a crisis. 
11 Although the effect of this variable is not statistically significant, its positive sign and, especially, the 
(jointly) significant role of capital openness suggest future research on the potential and effective 
actions of the central banks in emerging economies in crisis times.   
12 In particular, they show that, in the case of developing countries, distorted incentives within the 
financial sector can increase the likelihood of crises, making such countries more vulnerable. 
13 Although the 2008 financial crisis was the worst since 1929, it should be noted that reforms of  
“regulatory system and governance” have been – until now – very scarce at both international and 
national levels. Moreover, on a Keynesian view, it is important to mention that, on the occurrence 
of a financial crisis, the timing and size of the counter-cyclical monetary and fiscal policies are 
fundamental for reducing the magnitude and duration of a recession: for example, the very 
different cumulative real impact of the global financial crises in the US and in Europe (especially 
Eurozone) can be – at least partly – explained by the very different features and timing of the 
monetary and fiscal policies (e.g. Marelli and Signorelli, 2015). 
14 For a study adopting a long run approach not focused on crisis time, see Bonnala and Yayab (2015) 
who investigate the relationship among political institutions, trade openness, and economic growth 
using a panel of over 200 countries and eight non-overlapping five-year average observations for 
the period 1975–2010. 
